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Abstract: This paper investigates the basic risk and incentives relationship in franchising companies. 
The results of past research reflect volatile influence of risk and incentives. An in-depth 
analysis of this relationship was conducted using case study approach, including 12 inter-
national franchise firms of two types. Our study included retail and service franchising. 
Findings from this research confirm basic agency theory predictions. The risk-incentives 
relationship is negatively correlated in retail franchise companies, due to lower royalties 
in the sector. Service franchise companies do not follow the same concept, due to their 
adaptability of franchise system to local markets. We believe service franchise systems 
might be responsible for volatility. However, both types of companies nurture and develop 
strategies based on experience and intuition. Findings of the research offer important in-
sights in understanding the nature of franchisor’s risk perception, as the basic underlying 
mechanism to the risk and incentives relationship.
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Introduction
Franchising has been one of the most popular growth strategies in the last decade. 
We may expect further growth of this strategy in the near future. Risk and incentives 
have an interesting relationship when observed in franchising. For more than three 
decades researchers have been trying to understand the relationship between risk and 
incentives (Tebourbi, 2016). Some studies on this topic, applied agency theory (Ben-
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dickson et al., 2016; Bosse, Phillips, 2016) view to analyse this relation and showing 
that the agency theory predictions regarding the negative relationship do not always 
hold. The original agency theory model proposes that risk-averse employees do not 
accept pay based on performance when the risk in environment rises. Consequently, 
the model predicts the incentives (performance based pay) are lower in more uncer-
tain environments. Negative relation in the context of employer-employee relation-
ship was confirmed by many studies mostly by analysing the context of executives 
and employees.
 In franchising, the relationship between the risk and incentives shows inconsis-
tent pattern. Several studies (Lafontaine and Slade 2002; Lafontaine, Roger, Arbor, 
2005) point to the inverse relationship as an interesting phenomenon since the risk 
encourages the franchisee’s choice for investment. Due to inconsistent results in past 
studies, we believe there is a gap of understanding the relationship between the risk 
and incentives in franchising.
Our emphasis is on examining the in-depth nature of risk and incentives in fran-
chising. The key research question is how the franchisors relate to risk and incentives. 
Since risk and incentives according to agency theory have a negative relationship, 
we test whether the predicted negative relation between risk and incentives holds 
in the setting of twelve retail and service franchise firms. A purpose of our paper 
is to understand perspectives of risk and incentives attitudes in order to explain the 
inconsistency of past researches. According to Lafontaine and Slade (2002, 2007) 
incentives differ in franchise relationships due to industry sector of franchise compa-
nies. Therefore, our qualitative comparative case study includes 12 global franchise 
companies – 6 retail and 6 service franchise companies. 
To satisfy the triangulation and to secure construct validity the franchise con-
sultants as another source of data are included in our research. All these franchise 
consultants have rich experiences – minimum of 30 years. They all created lots of 
different franchise system that are present for more than 20 years on the franchise 
global market. This paper has the following structure. We first provide a review of 
relevant studies of this topic in franchising and its research deficit. Following chapter 
describes the study methodology and reasons for using qualitative study in our case. 
Furthermore, we summarize results of the data analysis. Discussion of results brings 
us to final conclusion of the study’s findings and implications.
Literature Review Regarding Risk and Incentives in Franchising 
As suggested by Prendergast (2002) the empirical work that investigated negative 
trade-off between the risk and incentives has not shown a very much support of 
agency theory prediction. The results of past studies by taking different measure of 
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incentives shows a rather inconsistent picture of the relation between risk and incen-
tives (Altinay et al., 2014, Alon 2012). 
Some authors re-emphasize a positive relation between risk and incentives (La-
fontaine, Roger, Arbor, 2005; Lafontaine, Slade 2007). The past researches on re-
tailing conclude that different indicators determine franchise contract. The contract 
terms in form of royalty are reflected with franchisor’s importance of effort, which 
lowers the franchisee’s effort. Factors such as risk and agent’s effort tend to increase 
the franchisee’s effort (Wimmer, Garen, 1997; Lafontaine, Roger, Arbor, 2005; La-
fontaine and Slade, 2007). 
Vazquez’s results (2005) confirm the positive relations between the risk and roy-
alties. A sharing parameter in terms of franchisee’s effort was accentuated (Kosova, 
Lafontaine, 2010). Higher franchisee’s effort results in lower royalties. Authors imply 
new explorations are needed in order to address the share parameter within business 
relationships. New researches executed in Japan based on Lafontaine’s model proved 
negative influence of outlet risk on royalties (Maruyama, Yamashita, 2010; 2012). 
They find out that franchisors with smaller margin rates are forced to charge high-
er royalties as the service franchise companies. We outline latest studies using risk 
measurement by focusing on many other parameters and not just relation to incen-
tives including margins as one form of incentives related to market size or franchise 
industry type. We need to embrace new approaches of analysis with integration of 
“new paradigms” (Dant 2008; Denzin and Lincoln 2011).
Research Methodology
Our study focuses on relationship between risk and incentives from franchisor’s per-
spective, where the focus is on exploratory in-depth analysis of relationship under 
study. We undertook a multiple case study approach in order to explore different 
cases with tendency of comparison. We decided to choose two types of franchise 
companies – retail franchise companies and service franchise companies. Our results 
are derived from 12 case studies of global franchise companies and 4 franchise con-
sultants. Therefore, our study is not limited to a country or territory and it is the first 
global study executed in terms of risk and incentive issues. Within each case study 
we contacted the franchise management in the company or franchise consultants 
directly. Franchise companies were contacted by phone. Introduction to the company 
was made either by email, personally or by phone (30 minutes introduction) followed 
by interview with semi-structured interview guideline (duration approximately 55 
minutes). We short-listed 20 global franchise companies with presence at EU mar-
ket and criteria of minimum 10 years of franchise experience including minimum 
150 franchise units. 12 companies accepted to participate - 6 retail and 6 services. 
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Eight franchise consultants were shortlisted based on minimum 30 years of franchise 
experience from UK, U.S and Australia. Four of them accepted the participation. 
The interviews with franchise consultants served to fulfil the triangulation conditions 
with duration of approximately 70 minutes as suggested by some scholars (Creswell 
2013). Franchise companies were randomly contacted at franchise exhibitions or dif-
ferent franchise events all over the world. Our target respondents were top managers 
or owners. 
The semi-structured interview guideline was set up based on independent vari-
able as parameters of environmental uncertainty, institutional uncertainty, economic 
uncertainty and cultural uncertainty. Incentives as dependent variable were measured 
with the level of royalties. The interview guideline included 22 questions, 12 ques-
tions were based on variables measured in the model. In order to achieve the com-
parison between the variables we stated questions about 3 types of uncertainties with 
their relation as “the most important, medium important and the least important”. 
Another group of interviewees was selected to gain a supplement to other methods 
in order to give a correct position including the maximization of our understanding of 
the study (Clifford, French, and Valentine, 2010). Questions were stated in a general 
form with purpose to gain their working experiences in 30 years but always referred 
to determined variables (environmental uncertainty, incentives). We encouraged 
open questions in order to achieve in-depth knowledge how certain variable effected 
company’s success or failure in international franchising. The questions about certain 
construct were stated as an inquiry into their general experience with environmental 
uncertainty in terms of economic, legal and cultural. Consequently, we encouraged 
them to explain their valuable insight stating effects toward avoiding the failures and 
importance of steps for franchise companies to achieve success. 
Using franchise consultant’s overview for the first time in qualitative studies we 
examine their experiences through franchisor’s mistakes. In this way we formulated 
different guidelines for determinants in franchise contracts. The recorder semi-struc-
tured interviews were executed face to face or by using Online Tools such as Skype.
Franchise consultants represent a very important group in our research. Differ-
ent resources in collecting the data put the internal validity on a higher level. We 
even managed to get collaboration of franchise consultant coming from different 
continents. This means the results revealed us also different perspectives in a global 
matter. Each franchise consultant has more than 30 years of franchise experience. 
Our interview guide was adapted for franchise consultants, but still following the 
semi-structured interview guideline for franchise companies. All these interviews 
were longer than 45 minutes and the discussion was very active with lots of additional 
information based on describing the mistakes made by franchisors.
All 16 interviews were transcribed and analyzed with pattern matching method of 
analyzing texts. We assured strict confidentiality to all participants and each was giv-
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en a code name in order to ease the analysis. Each of the interviewees was informed 
about the purpose of the research and how the data will be used. The process re-
vealed common and contradicting themes. Franchise overview of the incentives was 
collected in order to put also royalty together with different other forms of franchise 
fees such as IT or marketing fee.
Results
Evaluation of the risk as environmental uncertainty
Our study reveals that it is expected of a franchisee in retail franchise to deal with 
the risk of the local market. When franchise retail companies were asked about the 
risk at the franchisee’s market, they replied the risk is always being taken by the 
franchisee. Before signing the contract all companies have done a thorough research 
of franchisee’s local market to find out if the local market accepts the business mod-
el as well as if the figures provide a feasible income. Another issue retail franchisor 
outline is the supply and logistics that follow their expansion to another market. In 
this way, their industry has to be followed with an additional support. If these activ-
ities were not followed by franchisor, the franchisee would be disabled to open the 
franchise unit. 
Table 1 describes evaluation of uncertainty by retail franchisors. Most of them 
describe the cultural uncertainty or economic uncertainty as important and chal-
lenging. Only tea selling company from Austria sees no issue in it. Some companies 
put cultural uncertainty on the first place and some other economic uncertainty as 
the most important one. Cultural issues were addressed in order to discover if the 
franchise business matches the local society in terms of habits or hobbies. These 
issues were mostly solved by the franchisee. In particular they outlined the cultural 
differences as they cannot be solved when it comes to their products. The Austrian 
lingerie company and German bakery company outlined the adaptability of the prod-
uct as crucial in their business. Economic uncertainty demanded cooperative work 
in order to find out if the local market suits the financial needs that the franchisor’s 
business demands in order to assure profit for the franchisee. All companies placed 
the institutional risk as the least important.
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Table 1: Evaluation of uncertainty by the retail franchise companies
Franchise 
company Industry Relation to risk Evaluation of environmental uncertainty
R1 Tea 
selling
“We check them as emerging mar-
kets and we offer then normally li-
censing or master franchising. We 
do not really check out the market 
so much as we have the franchisee 
who takes over the responsibility.”
»A feasibility study is done together with our 
franchise candidate. We would evaluate together 
if the market was appropriate for us. The culture 
does not play important role and neither do legal 
issues. Therefore, it is up to franchisee, how he 
will succeed«
R2 Clothing “We do not execute any risk assess-
ments. If the franchisee liked the 
franchise, we would sell the license. 
If the market was too risky in terms 
of getting our payment for clothing, 
we would sell a license or we would 
just execute the export to the market 
with demanding advance payment.”
“We try to evaluate the cultural fashion styles, 
which is also in our case important not so much 




“We do not really check out the 
market so much as we have the fran-
chisee who takes over the responsi-
bility.”
“Yes, legal risk is important. Also the cultural 
risk is being researched. Usually, we pay atten-
tion to economic risk. Although, our products can 
be sold even in the markets with lower purchasing 
power.”
R4 Lingerie “We check the competitors, frequen-
cy of the potential buyers, rent level, 
incomes.” 
“Usually, the institutional issues are not a prob-
lem. We could deal with some issues just when it 
comes to different body measures in terms of oth-
er nations such as Chinese or Japanese market.”
“We see no legal issues and the most important 
for us is the economic uncertainty.”
R5 Bakery »We do not have risk – as we deal 
with one person.” 
“If someone from Albania came to us to buy our 
franchise, we would believe that there are too 
many cultural issues and this would not be ac-
ceptable for our system.” 
“Cultural habits of eating play a significant role 




“We have to do as much as possible 
to predict the problems our franchi-
see might have. Of course it is the 
franchisee, who takes the whole 
risk.”
“The most challenging is predicting their turn-
over. We start with the most important one. This 
is usually the GDP or income level. As we are a 
very unique system, we specifically check first the 
bird feeding habit at the market.”
 
From the viewpoint of retail franchisors the biggest challenge in international 
franchising is the process of finding out how their business could be adapted to 
succeed in the local market. All service franchisors claim how their system is due 
to services adaptable. It just depends mostly on economic issues how these services 
are being valued and also on the franchisee’s profile. Most of the service compa-
nies perceive legal uncertainty as the least important for their franchise system. It 
is considered as a protection of their know-how, but not of major concern. Most of 
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the companies explained that they have a good legal attorney to take care of their 
legal uncertainties. Economic and cultural uncertainties are being considered to be 
evaluated during the recruitment process together with franchisees. Both of these 
types of risk have feasible opportunities in the local market. Therefore, this enables 
service companies to perceive the risk in the franchisee’s local market at a lower 
level.
Franchise service companies indicated cultural uncertainty as one of the most 
important concerns (see Table 2). The replies given from service franchise compa-
nies outline how the risk is the franchisee’s responsibility. The franchisors help their 
franchisees to find out the feasibility of the franchise business. They argue that envi-
ronmental uncertainty when expanding to distant markets risk does not present such 
a big issue. They tend to use very extended and thorough plans of trainings called 
as modules or phases. During the trainings, they solve the challenges they have re-
garding adaptability of the services. In general, they plan their transfer of specific 
knowledge in a longer period between 9 and 12 months. They all keep their know-
how in on-line intranet form. Therefore the education process can be assured in 24/7 
form. The more distant the market is, the longer the period of trainings in order to 
overcome all the differences.
All service companies agree that economic uncertainty plays the most important 
role in setting up a new franchise. When companies were asked about institutional 
and cultural differences, most of them stated the cultural difference is more import-
ant than the institutional due to their strong legal departments or lawyers. They are 
able to adapt their franchise contract according to different law or legal differences 
applied to host market.
To summarize, retail franchise companies are aware of higher level of environ-
mental uncertainty. It disables them to sell franchise license in order to achieve 
trust, appropriate support and supply. Another option for them is to execute simple 
wholesale export activity which means no franchise relationship. All retail franchise 
companies exposed their problem of franchising in adaptation of their business sys-
tem in the distant markets. Despite careful decision-making when it comes to riskier 
markets, they outlined that in the end it is the franchisee that carries the whole risk. 
Service companies are mostly worried about the cultural uncertainty. They don’t 
perceive significant problems to overcome the economic or institutional differences. 
Mostly, they adapt the business franchise model to local market. Their biggest con-
cern is mostly the selections of the franchisee as the suitable person who takes care 
of the investment.
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Table 2: Evaluation of uncertainty by the service franchise companies
Franchise 
company Industry Relation to risk
Evaluation of environmental 
uncertainty
S1 Headhunting “Our richest market at the moment is 
taken care with someone locally so we 
do not have any problems regarding 
cultural issues.”
“It is in some areas absolutely fine. In 
Europe we can sue someone. In many EU 
countries we have a good chance to actu-
ally win the case. We are very concerned 
about the USA. Big areas are the emerg-
ing markers. China, Africa, Middle East. 
Do we have interest in Africa? Maybe, 
south Africa… It is always going down to 
Commonwealth countries due to legisla-
tion as it is very similar.”
S2 Business 
Consultancy
“They need to determine if this is the 
risk they want to be exposed to. How-
ever, we have found that whenever the 
franchisee follows the protocols in our 
system, they do it wonderful.” 
“First of all, we look at country’s eco-
nomic system and then we pay attention 
on the government and last but not least 
we consider the political system. We try to 
evaluate the characteristics of the bank-
ing system. Based upon these risks we 
would negotiate with our franchisee.”
S3 Business 
Coaching
“We have learned from our past mis-
takes and we have talked with many 
people about the research of a single 
market how to approach to unknown 
market in a best way possible. How 
to overcome huge problems in these 
phases.”
“The most important factors are: GDP, 
existing franchisees or similar franchises 
developed. We check if there are any oth-
er coaching businesses or other similar 
business companies. This could be rather 
a huge problem for us.”
S4 Networking “The biggest challenge: different men-
tality – everybody starts with it. Every-
body including US companies have this 
kind of problems. It is harder to sell a 
franchise outside of L.A. The closest 
franchise unit is the more likely will 
be successful”. The biggest hurdle is 
getting passed this claim of being dif-
ferent.”
The same service franchise company with 
more than 400 franchise units all over the 
world in networking industry replied: 
“Economic uncertainty is not a problem 
and institutional just in terms of franchise 
laws… However, it is possible to over-
come these problems. We have the biggest 
problem regarding cultural terms.”
S5 Computer
education
“We do this to make sure that the econo-
my is still going. The calculations of risk 
had been executed before the contract 
was signed.«
“So we turn our attention to economic 
uncertainty and not so much to legal, 
institutional or cultural. The franchisee 




“The real risk comes from people who 
cannot follow the system. There is a 
risk that a franchisee has not done its 
job with due diligence and overviewed 
the whole risk situations in his business 
plan. There is a certain risk if do not 
have the independent experience.”
“In the past we avoided areas where the 
most important risks are legal… Let’s 
take China for example. In our industry 
there are many companies which come 
with their own solutions and they will 
copy the cartridges. We do not have any 
legal rights due to the legal system. Sim-
ilar applies to the trade marks in India 
and China. Therefore potential franchi-
sees can’t be very successful.” .
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Evaluation of the incentives
We found out a very high difference in royalty levels between the retail and service 
franchise chains. On one hand the bakery company from Germany charges the high-
est one. On the other hand an Austrian company with underwear clothing charges 
none. They are both retail companies. Printing service franchise company form US 
set the minimum royalty with 6%. We found out that the lowest royalty in services is 
the highest in retail companies. We have two companies with 15% of royalty and the 
highest is the 30% charged by Australian franchise company for business coaching. 
The average royalty in service franchise companies is 3-times higher than in retail 
companies. Royalty levels clearly show how retail and service companies differently 
structure the monthly royalty payments.
We may argue that franchisors are ready to lower the royalty rates. The franchisors 
claim they are even prepared to give up royalties for a certain period of time to provide 
more incentives to franchisees. Both types of franchise companies (see Table 3) provid-
ed these kinds of incentives to franchisees in case the risk would rise at the franchisee’s 
local market. Our study suggests that franchisors are ready to adapt their royalty level 
for a certain period of time, which gives additional incentives to franchisees.
Table 3: Incentives by retail and services franchise companies
Retail 
companies
Change of royalties and additional 
incentives for franchisors Service companies
Change of royalties and 




“We really want to help them to realise their 
dreams. Since our system is pretty much or-
ganised and prepared for analysing the host 
market, we offer them any help they need 
and we do not charge them. We believe they 
deserve and need our help at the beginning 





“Well, these things also happen 
and if we really see and find out 
certain things are not working for a 
franchisee, we’ll agree to lower the 
royalty level for a certain period of 
time. In this way we help them ad-
ditionally on local market to make 
their business recover.” 
R2
Clothing
“We do a lot of support. Also not standard-
ized support. When franchisee needs support 
or advice they turn to us. We consult them ac-
cording to how we do business in our compa-
ny units. Just our experience that we transfer 




»We would give them extra coach-
ing, review of their marketing plans. 
Our CEO will talk to them to see 
what works for them and what does 
not work. We certainly adapt to 




We are in particular paying attention at the 
beginning of our relationship. If the local 
market has been shown to have some partic-
ular issues we did not succeed to predict in 
our recruitment phase. We help our franchi-
see with additional support by being present 
in the unit more often locally. We even lower 




“We do not charge our franchisee 
additionally if we help him or her 
to find out if our system is at their 
market scalable and profitable. We 
really want to make sure at the be-
ginning of our relationship if the 
franchise system will work and if it 
is profitable.” 
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Our comparative case analysis includes also international franchise consultants 
as a third party. Their replies explain how franchisors perceive risk and areas where 
franchisors often make mistakes. Mostly they refer to mistakes made in international 
franchising. Franchise consultants do not consider that the institutional uncertain-
ty has a major role in influencing the royalties. After economic uncertainties the 
cultural differences were mentioned as crucial also. The cultural issue revealed a 
bigger importance in comparison to institutional challenges. Additionally, localiza-
tion adaptability was mentioned with mistakes by global companies like McDonalds 
or Starbucks. Mistakes were in an interview described when these companies were 
entering the territories like India and Australia with a company-owned unit (subsid-
iary). No localization was made to local market uncertainties. All franchise consul-
tants suggest that franchisors learn in their process of franchise experiences by not 
repeating same mistake twice. The franchise consultants additionally accentuated 
that care and trust play an important role. 
Discussion
The results collected from retail and service company imply the importance of fran-
chisor’s effort which was also proposed by Wimmer and Garen (1997) and Vazquez 
(2005). Although, Lafontaine and Slade (2002) in their study suggest that franchi-
sor’s effort in terms of asset specificity should not be seen as an important role in 
franchising. We believe retail and service franchise companies do have some crucial 
differences in terms of intangible assets. This was implied by Maruyama and Ya-
mashita (2012) despite their opposite conclusion that royalties are related to maintain 
input sales revenues. They both conclude that franchisor’s and franchisee’s efforts are 
important which our qualitative research confirms.
We can tentatively conclude service franchise companies have reasons to charge 
higher royalties with an assumption their effort shows a greater value. This was con-
firmed also by Maruyama and Yamashita (2012). Retail franchise companies eval-
uate risk on a higher level in comparison to services. This indicates retail franchise 
systems perceive risk higher due to selling products being unable to adapt to cultural 
differences. Retail companies set lower royalties rates and offer higher incentives to 
their franchisees. On the other hand, retail companies charge franchisees with extra 
margins on selling their products. According to our data, most of the retail compa-
nies charge margins from 50 – 150 percent. Service franchise systems manage the 
risk with adaptability of their franchise system and they charge higher royalties. This 
type of companies does not confirm the predictions of the agency theory. The conclu-
sion about retail companies and their margins should be used as a further indicator in 
determining the relations between the risk and incentives in franchising.
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Furthermore, the study appointed how franchisor’s sense of risk leads to mistakes 
by not evaluating the risk in the local market. Franchisor’s effort in developing trust 
with its CEO and the franchise support management team means a certain value to 
franchisee. The franchise consultants argue that leaders with their leadership style 
play an important role by gaining the franchisees effort and loyalty on their side. 
They outline franchise companies do not relate to individual needs of franchisees. 
Franchise companies very often provide framework of their support services not 
applied to cultural differences. Due to this reason, franchisors do not outline the 
risk-sharing in their franchise relationship. They admit it is up to their franchisee to 
face the risk. On the other side, franchisors execute their effort and franchisee applies 
their business model to local market. 
Conclusion
The franchise companies in our study indicate complexity of franchise industry. Ser-
vice companies outline that feasibility of their business eliminates the risk at the 
local market. Retail companies determine alternatives by not using franchising busi-
ness model. It seems risk as a determinant of incentives does not apply to agency 
theory. Franchisors from our study understand that it is the franchisee that takes over 
the whole responsibility. 
We found out that service companies have higher royalties which denies the agen-
cy theory predictions. On the other hand retail companies charge lower royalties. We 
believe incentives cannot be measured explicitly only by royalties. Margins should be 
included as well as other franchisor’s incentives. The franchise firms are faced with 
paradigmatic change, resulting from evolution of franchise business models. 
The results of this research clearly indicate that established agency theory approach 
has to be modified to address the new paradigm shift in basic operation of industry. 
Our research also provides some insights to the new potential franchisees, or franchise 
system owners. Better understanding of franchising leads small business owners to 
reconsider franchising as a business option. Complexity of franchise system demands 
higher level of control which creates again higher costs resulting in higher incentives.
Our research indicates franchisor’s effort in terms of adaptability becomes a ne-
cessity in order for franchise unit to be feasible in the local markets. This factor is 
a necessity for successful international expansion. Furthermore, more experienced 
franchisors tend to take time and evaluate the local franchisee’s markets. Experi-
enced franchise companies actively develop strategies based on experience and in-
tuition. We propose the influence of control in franchising with trust and care, to be 
investigated in further research. New forms of future research could reveal us further 
issues being present in relationship between the risk and incentives in franchising.
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